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MARKET POWER AND SWITCHING COSTS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ONLINE NETWORKING MARKET
Shin-Ru Cheng*

I. INTRODUCTION
Digital platforms have a profound influence on our lives. Specifically,
online networking platforms are actively involved in our social activities1
and have morphed into significant information centers, providing more
convenient ways to learn about the world.2 Although there are countless
digital platforms, ten networks are dominating the digital space. Based on
2019 statistics, the top ten social networking platforms in the United
States, measured by the number of monthly users, are Facebook,
Instagram, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat,
WhatsApp, Messenger by Google, and Tumblr.3
Facebook owns four of the top ten platforms. It controls Instagram,
Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp,4 covering the vast majority of the
market. Facebook generated $85,965 million in 2020,5 and the company’s
chief executive officer, Mark Zuckerberg, has become one of the
wealthiest entrepreneurs on the planet.6 His wealth could be used unjustly
if Facebook takes advantage of market failure instead of providing
services in a more productive way.7 Therefore, it is essential to identify
what causes markets to fail, examine what would occur if the tech market

* JSPS International Research Fellow at Kyoto University. J.S.D, Washington University in St. Louis;
MJur, University of Oxford; L.L.M, UC Berkeley; L.L.B, National Taiwan University. Admitted to Taipei
Bar Association. Admission to California bar expected in December 2021. This Article constitutes part of
my J.S.D. dissertation. I am deeply indebted to Professor Lee Epstein, Professor Gerrit DeGeest and
Professor John Drobak for all their valuable advice on this Article. I also appreciate all editors for their
assistance.
1. See SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND
GOOGLE, at 100-04 (2017).
2. See Malwina Popio, The Role of Facebook in the Process of Acquiring Information INT. J.
EDUC. CULT. SOC. NO 1 2015, 24-25 (2015).
3. See Most popular mobile social networking apps in the United States as of September 2019,
by monthly users, STATISTA (Jul. 6, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/248074/most-popular-ussocial-networking-apps-ranked-by-audience/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
4. See Facebook, Annual Report (Form 10-K, 3) (Jan. 28, 2021).
5. Facebook’s Annual Revenue from 2009 to 2020, STATISTA (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/268604/annual-revenue-of-facebook/.
6. See Forbes World’s Billionaire List: The Richest in 2021, (Kerry A. Dolan et al. eds.) FORBES
(2021), https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (choose “Mark Zuckerberg” from dropdown; then click
“Full Profile”).
7. Unlike profits gained from productive behaviors, the artificial profits (also called “rent”)
generated by exploiting market failure results in income inequality. See GERRIT DE GEEST, RENT: HOW
MARKETING CAUSES INEQUALITY, 4-6 (2018).
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failed, and take action to remove market distortions.8
Facebook’s overwhelming dominance9 in the marketplace has attracted
multiple antitrust investigations. Authorities are concerned that
“Facebook may have put consumer data at risk, reduced the quality of
consumers’ choices, and increased the price of advertising.”10
Furthermore, several scholars are encouraging these investigations into
Facebook’s data harvesting activities.11 Based on the concerns of
policymakers, the number of antitrust investigations implicating
Facebook and other online networking platforms will likely increase.
The Sherman Act guides all antitrust inquiries in the United States.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful, conduct that “cause[s] an
increase in market power…that is not competition on the merits.”12
Accordingly, to prove Facebook violated Section 2 of the Act, a
complainant would have to demonstrate that Facebook acquired
monopoly power,13 referring to a substantial level of market power.14
Alternatively, one can prevail upon showing “a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power.”15
Based on this definition, antitrust inquiries depend upon an accurate
definition of a commercial entity’s market power. Traditionally, market
power was defined as “a firm’s ability to increase profits by reducing
output and charging more than a competitive price for its products.”16 To
8. Id. at 5. The author has indicated several methods that a company may employ to distort market
competition, such as reducing market transparency, exploiting non-informed consumers, lock-in effects
and network externalities, and exploiting human beings’ irrationality. Id. at 3.
9. Based on social media site visits, Facebook has nearly 71.8 percent market share in the United
States. See Leading Social Media Websites in the United States in May 2021, Based on Share of Visits,
STATISTA (Jun. 17, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265773/market-share-of-the-most-popularsocial-media-websites-in-the-us.
10. See Annie Palmer, 47 Attorneys General Are Investigating Facebook For Antitrust Violations
CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/47-attorneys-general-areinvestigating-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.html.
11. See, e.g., Diana Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey
Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy 16 BERKELEY BUS. L. J.,
98-101 (2019); Keith Hylton, Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law 98 NEB. L. REV. 272, 296.
12. A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law Is Not That Complicated, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 166
(2017).
13. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir., 2001) (“Section 2 of the Sherman
Act makes it unlawful for a firm to ‘monopolize’ 15 U.S.C. § 2. The offense of monopolization has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of product,
business acumen, or historic accident” (citation omitted)).
14. See Mark R. Patterson, Google and Search Engine Market Power, HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6
(2013).
15. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). (reasoning that establishing
attempted monopolization requires proof “(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power.”).
16. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
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concretize this abstract definition, various approaches have been
proposed. The market share approach17 and the entry barriers approach18
are the two most frequently adopted by courts. Less frequently, courts
adopt the switching costs approach and various other methods, which rely
on market structures or correlations between prices and costs.
In United States v. Microsoft, 19 the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit applied the switching costs approach to assess the market
power of an online networking platform. In simple terms, the switching
costs approach infers market power based on consumers’ abilities to
switch from one provider to another.20
The switching costs approach is suitable for assessing the market
power of Facebook because, in the absence of exterior competition and
presence of high entry barriers, the ability to switch within a market is a
critical mechanism to facilitate competition.21 In fact, this approach has
been used in several other cases related to digital products.22
Courts have recognized the utility of this approach in the context of
PRACTICE, 106 (2016).
17. Several approaches have been advanced by courts. The market share approach is accepted by
courts and regulatory agencies. It can be applied to a wide variety of markets. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 21
(2008). The approach determines the market power by relying on firms’ market share, which offers a
straightforward and practical method for trial purposes. Id. at 21-25.
18. The other commonly utilized method is the entry barriers approach, first mentioned by the
Supreme Court in 1992. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992).
The approach focuses on the possibility of entering the market at issue. Specifically, the approach claims
that if potential competing firms can easily enter the market, or the existing firms can expand output to
the market without significant difficulties, the market is competitive, regardless of the market
concentration. This is because challenges from current and potential competing firms frustrate the
monopolists’ efforts to set super-competitive prices.
19. To prove that Microsoft (defendant) had monopoly power, the Department of Justice (Plaintiff)
showed that Microsoft owned more than 95 percent of market share in Intel-compatible operating system.
Furthermore, more than 7000 Microsoft applications were unavailable in competing operating systems
(such as Mac OS). This constituted a substantial compatibility switching cost. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55-56, 60 (D.C. Cir., 2001). The Court found Microsoft’s monopoly power on the
ground that “customers would not switch from Windows to a Mac OS in response to a substantial price
increase because of the costs of acquiring the new hardware needed to run Mac OS (an Apple computer
and peripherals) and compatible software applications, as well as because of the effort involved in learning
the new system and transferring files to its format.” Id. at 52.
20. See generally, Universal Avionics Sys. Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 947,
955 (D. Ariz. 2001).
21 Here, Facebook’s interior competition refers to the competition among existing online networking
platforms, such as Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat. Due to the presence of entry barriers, potential
entrants could not pose a threat to Facebook. Therefore, interior competition plays a much more important
role in maintaining market competition.
22 See Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A
Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 169, 189-91 (2013). Edlin and Harris
concluded that switching costs play an essential role in antitrust law analysis in three dimensions: (1)
narrowing market definition (2) assessing market power; and (3) exclusionary conduct. Id.
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online networking platforms. For example, in Microsoft, the court
concluded that Microsoft had monopoly power in the operating systems
market based on the switching costs approach, holding that high
switching costs in Microsoft’s operating system constituted substantial
entry barriers.23 These entry barriers, in turn, indicated a substantial level
of market power. Going forward, researchers should apply the switching
costs approach to measure the market power of other online networking
platforms.
Accordingly, this Article presents the author’s own empirical study
(“the study”) that analyzes Facebook’s market power under the switching
costs approach. The study examines users’ switching behaviors in
response to significant changes in Facebook’s service quality. As an
initial hypothesis, the study assumes that if users are able to switch to
other platforms because of Facebook’s inferior service, then low or
moderate switching costs in the market can be inferred. The study
determines that, under the switching costs approach, Facebook would not
have sufficient market power to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
Part II of this Article addresses the role of switching costs analyses in
antitrust investigations. Part III presents the author’s study, illustrating the
empirical methodology, including data collection and analysis. Part III
also provides several observations regarding application of the switching
costs approach to guide decisionmakers in their analysis of the market
power of other digital platforms. Finally, Part IV summarizes the main
findings of the study.
II. LOCK-IN EFFECTS AND MARKET POWER
According to the switching costs approach, firms gain a large market
share by locking-in users through significant exit costs.24 These exit costs
may originate from market structures or firms’ policies. The costs, in turn,
create market barriers for new entrants.25 In this regard, this Part explains
the economic concept of switching costs and resulting lock-in effects as

23. See Microsoft, 253 F. 3d, at 19-24.
24. Jiawei Chen & Michael Sacks, Reimbursing Consumers’ Switching Costs in Network
Industries, NET INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 16-13, 1 (2016).
25. Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition With Switching
Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 1967 1974, 1998-2001, (M. Armstrong & R.
Porter eds., 2007). Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs 97
ECON. J. 99, 99 (1987) [hereinafter Klemperer, Entry Deterrence]. Paul Klemperer, Competition When
Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization
Macroeconomics, and International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 515, 536 (1995) [hereinafter Klemperer,
Competition]. Pei-yu Chen & Lorin M. Hitt, Information Technology and Switching Costs 9 (2005),
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.458.1995&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
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well as how online networking platforms may produce switching costs.
A. Switching Costs and Lock-In Effects
The presence of switching costs can be observed through several
examples, such as buyers having to repeatedly purchase similar products
from the same supplier. In another scenario, buyers would have to
“purchase follow-on products such as service and repair” from the same
supplier.26 Switching costs can come from various sources, including
market structures and product designs.27
Switching costs play a crucial role in consumption decisions.
Economic research has highlighted, based on switching costs, the
correlation between a product’s utility level and purchasing decisions.28
For example, imagine that there are two customers: A and B. In this
scenario, A purchased product X based on the product’s utility level. In
addition to product X, consumers may purchase product Y. There are two
periods in which consumers may decide which product to purchase.29
In each period, customers A and B have three options: purchase X,
purchase Y, or make no purchase at all.30 u stands for utility. 𝑢𝑃𝐶 stands
for the utility the customer gained from purchasing the product. S stands
𝐶
for switching costs and Ø stands for the product. 𝑆Ø𝑃
stands for the
𝐶
switching costs associated with purchasing the product. Conversely, 𝑆𝑃Ø
stands for the switching costs associated with not purchasing the product.
The utilities of each decision in period A are as follows.31
Action
Purchase X
Purchase Y
No Purchase

Customer A
𝑢𝑋𝐴

Customer B
𝐵
𝑢𝑋𝐵 − 𝑆Ø𝑋

𝑢𝑌𝐴 −

𝐵
𝑢𝑌𝐵 − 𝑆Ø𝑌

𝐴
𝑆Ø𝑌

𝐴
𝑆𝑋𝑌
−

𝐴
− 𝑆𝑋Ø

0

The chart illustrates that, compared to customer B who has no previous
experience purchasing X, customer A tends to purchase X because the
𝐴
𝐴
switching costs are 𝑆𝑋𝑌
and 𝑆Ø𝑌
. Accordingly, A will decide to switch
from product X to product Y only if the utility of product Y is higher than
𝐴
𝐴
A’s switching costs—𝑆𝑋𝑌
and 𝑆Ø𝑌
. Therefore, “[a]n excellent product
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 25, at 1972.
See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 176.
See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 4-6.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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can have poor sales if customers face high switching costs.”32 By contrast,
switching costs may maintain a low quality product’s competitive
advantage.33
Lock-in effects occur when there are “switching costs that are
sufficiently high so that buyers stay with a current supplier rather than
switching to a supplier whose products they consider to be preferable (or,
alternatively, that the costs of switching suppliers exceed the benefits of
switching).”34
In practice, locking-in customers is a common business strategy to
retain customers—of course, in addition to providing superior products.35
This is particularly true in markets where fixed costs and the costs
associated with obtaining new customers are particularly high.36 For the
former, firms need switching costs to retain a minimum number of
customers to cover fixed costs; for the latter, switching costs attract new
customers in an affordable manner. Information-related industries
highlight how switching costs influence profitability, 37 a point discussed
below in reference to Facebook.
B. Switching Costs in the Online Networking Market
At first glance, it seems that switching among online networking
platforms is an effortless process for consumers. Technically speaking,
users can leave Facebook with the click of a button. Additionally,
Facebook does not set switching restrictions—neither contractually nor
through its practices. Switching to other online networking platforms is
free for consumers. Moreover, Facebook users are able to download their
own personal data from the website.38 Complete data migration, moving
data from one platform to another, ensures that users’ important digital
documents will not be lost during the process of switching to another
platform.
However, some features of Facebook suggest the opposite. Leaving
Facebook may create substantial switching costs for businesses and

32. Id. at 7-8.
33. Id. at 8.
34. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 176.
35. See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 443, (noting that “a firm can be successful at retaining
customers either because they offer superior products (at least for a specific set of consumers), or because
they have high switching costs.”).
36. Id. at 438.
37. Id.
38. Accessing
&
Downloading
Your
Information,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1701730696756992?helpref=hc_global_nav (last visited Sept. 17,
2021). In some jurisdictions, Facebook has an obigation to port users’ data to appointed platforms upon
request.]
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individual users, including compatibility costs, uncertainty costs, and
learning costs. Literature in the field of economics has identified several
types of switching costs.39 The following Sections discuss the types of
switching costs and switching costs’ impact on the online networking
market.
1. Search Costs
Search costs are incurred in the process of finding and understanding
new suppliers.40 Search costs depend on the degree of transparency in the
market. The securities market is comparatively transparent because
various security regulations require issuers to disclose relevant and
important information to investors. Similarly, the insurance market and
other highly regulated industries that impose mandatory disclosure
requirements on companies tend to be more transparent. Accordingly,
search costs are low in these markets.
Search costs are induced if comparing prices between products
becomes harder for consumers. Big data analysis technologies are
growing in sophistication. Consequently, online shopping platforms can
capture consumers’ consumption preferences more precisely and generate
personalized prices at no cost.41 Because personalized prices are set
depending on the willingness of individual consumers to purchase
products, such products lose their standard prices for comparison
purposes. As a result, it is difficult for consumers to determine whether
prices are fair, and additional resources are usually necessary for
consumers to obtain relevant information about such products.
Moreover, search costs can be induced through product design. Sellers
can design several types of products with similar functions to promote
more transactions. A common example of this practice is the sale of
cookies. Companies sell different types of cookies in different boxes with
varying prices. This strategy makes comparing the products futile.
This rather simple example of a cookie box can also apply to online
networking platforms. Facebook provides personalized services to each
user. For example, Facebook recommends “friends” to a specific user
depending on the user’s already-existing friend network. Facebook also
displays personalized news and sends targeted advertisements.

39. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 178.
40. Id. at 181. See also Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 446.
41. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 37 (1998). Price strategies include: (1) personalized pricing to “[s]ell to each user
at a different price”; (2) versioning to “[o]ffer a product line and let users choose the version of the product
most appropriate for them”; and (3) group pricing to “[s]et different prices for different groups of
consumers, as in student discount.” Id. at 39.
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Additionally, it allows users to customize privacy settings. Because of
these personalized services, each individual user may have a different
experience with Facebook. Consequently, the seeming uniqueness of each
Facebook account makes it difficult to undertake a comparison of users’
experiences on the platform.42
It is noteworthy that consumers having additional information does not
necessarily translate into a reduction in search costs. This observation is
particularly relevant to online networking platforms. For example,
Facebook publishes privacy policies on its website, and users can easily
access these policies. Given that the policies are written in legal jargon
with lengthy and detailed sentences, readers must spend considerable time
reading them to understand them. Errors in readers’ interpretations of
these clauses should therefore be expected.43
2. Compatibility Costs
The second type of switching costs arises because of products’
incompatibilities with various other products. When a current product is
incompatible with a new product, buyers are often required to obtain
follow-on products from the same seller. Without follow-on products, the
buyer may lose the current product’s utility.44 In this scenario, the utility
lost is a compatibility cost. For example, when a cellphone buyer chooses
Apple’s iPhone, the buyer is locked into follow-on products designed by
Apple, such as the App Store, Apple-compatible chargers, and other
accessories.
Recent research suggests that network effects are strong in the online
networking market. Thus, users who contemplate switching to other
platforms face significant compatibility costs. Network effects refer to
when a product’s value increases as more people use the product.
Network effects arise in markets where “every adoption thus
complements every other.”45 For example, Facebook’s overall value
42. In a transparent market, information products price competition will ultimately reduce price to
zero. The reason is that in such a market, “competitive forces tend to move the price toward marginal cost,
the cost of producing an ‘addition’ copy,” which is close to zero for information products. Id. at 24-25.
To avoid cut-throat price competition, firms must differentiate products or “achieve cost leadership.” Id.
at 32-33.
43. Johnson’s empirical research investigated 10,000 Internet household and three commoditylike products and found that “households visit only 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites, and 1.8 travel sites”,
which shows “the amount of online searches is actually quite limited.” See Eric J. Johnson, et al., On the
Depth and Dynamics of Online Search Behavior, 50 MGMT. SCI.299, 299 (2004). This suggests that even
though the Internet has made information more accessible to customers, additional information does not
necessarily promote more switching and lead to price or quality competition.
44. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 178. See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at
517.
45. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 25, at 2007. See also Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at
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increases when additional users join the network; those users contribute
more information to Facebook’s ecosystem, which makes the website
more attractive to non-users.46 Indeed, because of network effects,
Facebook has become the largest online networking platform in the
United States. Therefore, once Facebook users switch to other platforms,
they lose opportunities to engage with existing users.
For businesses, leaving Facebook for another platform may involve
significant financial losses. A great number of businesses rely on
Facebook to advertise their products. At the same time, consumers count
on Facebook to seek out relevant products and businesses.47 Hence,
businesses have to establish their presence on Facebook. They must build
their reputation, promote their products, and foster client relationships.
All of this requires major upfront commitments. Therefore, leaving
Facebook is equivalent to abandoning established connections with
consumers. Because of their fear of losing established networks,
businesses are discouraged from switching to other online networking
platforms. The same response is observed in non-business users. Nonbusiness Facebook users may spend years building their own friendship
networks and personalized homepages with unique personal images.
These individuals may use Facebook as their primary tool for
communicating with friends. At present, there is no comparable
alternative to Facebook. Thus, users may feel socially isolated if they
leave the platform. As a result, while Facebook allows users to transfer
their data to other platforms, this data may be useless if it cannot be easily
stored and managed on another online networking platform.48 Therefore,
compatibility costs resulting from switching to other online networking
platforms may be inevitable.49
As discussed above, personalized services implicate compatibility
costs. Data-driven businesses provide personalized services50 to meet
178 (arguing “the benefits of adoption by any single user increases as other consumers adopt”).
46. About
Marketplace
for
Business,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/289268564912664?id=150605362430228.
47. Id.
48. In practice, Facebook has launched policies allowing users to transfer their personal data across
platforms, such as transferring photos on Facebook to Google Photos. William Morland, Data Transfer
Project: Enabling portability of photos and videos between services, FACEBOOK,
https://engineering.fb.com/2019/12/02/security/data-transfer-project/.
However, these policies are
insufficient to conclude that cross platform data transfers have reduced entry barriers. More importantly,
it is not certain whether Facebook will allow its competing platforms to request a large-scale data transfers
on behalf of users.
49. Scholars classify the costs incurred due to data portability as transaction costs. See Edlin &
Harris, supra note 22, at 181.
50. Firms can identify their customers’ preferences by relying on the following tools: “cookie, log
files, data mining technologies, customer profiling techniques, collaborative filtering technologies (e.g.,
recommendation systems) and other personalization technologies.” See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at
454.
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their users’ personal needs.51 As a result, when users leave these data-rich
environments, they lose the value of such personalized services.52
3. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are costs incurred in the course of a transaction,
including the money, time, and effort spent on transacting.53 Transaction
costs are inevitable. These costs deter consumers from switching to other
products when it is unclear the expected gains of switching exceed
potential transaction costs.54
Indeed, modern technology reduces transaction costs. For example, in
the past, traders spent much time and effort traveling from one place to
another to complete transactions. Modern communication technologies
make remote communication possible. Facebook Messenger and other
communication applications offer a free and convenient way for traders
to communicate with their clients. Accordingly, travel is no longer
necessary to make important communications.
Modern technologies also simplify business transactions.55 For
example, some websites allow users to create accounts on their platform
with Facebook identities, saving the time it would take to create a new
account and change the platform’s default settings to the user’s
preferences.56
Conversely, technological developments have created new types of
transaction costs. For example, because each online networking platform
adopts different formats to store and organize data, technical barriers can
deter data sharing and portability. Until solutions to these issues are
discovered, users who migrate between platforms must accept higher
transaction costs.57
4. Learning Costs
When receiving a new product, one has to learn how it functions.58 All

51. Id. See also Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 827, 829
(2019) (noting regular customers can use companies’ artificial intelligent algorithms to recommend
“where to buy the products, evaluate their price and quality, and update the consumer along the way or
give preapproval notifications if preferred”).
52. Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 454.
53. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181. See also Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer
Switching Costs 102 Q. J. ECON. 375, 375 (1987) [hereinafter Klemperer, Switching Costs].
54. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181.
55. See Chen & Hitt, supra note 25, at 446.
56. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 181.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 182; see, e.g., Klemperer, Switching Costs, supra note 53, at 375; Klemperer,
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the effort, time, and resources spent on familiarizing oneself with a
product are learning costs. Research suggests that the degree of products’
significance and distinction,59 customers’ familiarities,60 as well as
customers’ frequencies of repurchases,61 are positively correlated with
learning costs.
Learning how to use new online networking platforms may be
challenging for some users. Every platform has its own layout and
different functions. For those who use social networking applications less
often, learning how to use a new platform can be time-consuming.
Learning costs vary between individuals. For example, younger users
who grew up with the Internet may spend less time learning how to set up
personal profiles on different online networking platforms. In fact, most
teenagers have access to multiple social networking applications from
their smartphones.62 By contrast, older generations may face difficulties
joining new networking platforms. As a result, a period of adjustment is
to be expected in certain situations when users must learn how to use a
new product.
5. Contractual Costs
Contractual costs refer to losses incurred if contractual obligations are
violated. Awards and punishments are two common contractual cost
approaches that businesses employ to strengthen relationships with
customers.63
For example, businesses establish loyalty programs to award existing
customers. By providing benefits to loyal customers, the program
encourages these customers to maintain long-term relationships with the
business. Various rules guide these programs. For example, customers
Competition, supra note 25, at 517.
59. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 182. A study posits that “[t]he more significant the
differences are across products, and the longer or more concentrated the efforts required to learn how to
use a different product, the greater the costs of switching between products.” Id.
60. Some empirical studies emphasize the level of familiarity with a website and purchasing rate.
Bucklin and Sismeiro investigated the correlation between website browsing behaviors and the length of
time spent on each page, finding that the more frequently the browsers visit a website, the longer time
they spend on it. This finding reflects the fact that efforts to be familiar with new websites discourage
switching. See Randolph E. Bucklin & Catarina Sismeiro, A Model of Web Site Browsing Behavior
Estimated on Clickstream Data, 40 J. MKTG. RES. 249, 249 (2003).
61. Moe and Fader focus on visit frequency and purchasing rate. They found evidence that “people
who visit a retail site more frequently have a greater propensity to buy.” See Wendy W. Moe & Peter S.
Fader, Capturing Evolving Visit Behavior in Clickstream Data, 18 J. INTERACT. MKTG. 5, 5 (2004).
62. Seventy-one percent of teenagers between 13-17 years old use more than one social
networking websites. ACT FOR YOUTH, Youth Statistics: Internet & Social Media,
http://actforyouth.net/adolescence/demographics/internet.cfm.
63. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 180; See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at
517-18.
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may be required to purchase a certain quantity of goods or refer a certain
number of friends to a business. Customers who fail to meet these
contractual terms may lose their membership benefits in the loyalty
program. In practice, loyalty programs are common in the food and
beverage, cosmetics, and supplement and vitamins industries.64
Similarly, businesses can strengthen relationships with consumers by
including punitive clauses in contracts. For example, banks grant
additional bonuses to customers on the condition that those customers
deposit particular sums of money for a specified period of time. Failing
to meet these conditions leads to the loss of that additional bonus. In some
situations, consumers may even have to pay money back to the bank.65
Similar systems are in place in the fitness, rental, and telecommunications
industries.
So far, it is not clear whether contractual costs exist on Facebook.
When users agree to Facebook’s terms and conditions, they form a
contractual relationship with the company. Users have the right to enjoy
Facebook’s services and in turn agree to Facebook’s collection and use of
their data for Facebook’s business purposes.66 Different from loyalty
programs and punitive clauses, these terms neither render contractual
rewards nor create obligations for users. It appears that users can leave,
suspend, and stay on Facebook as long as they wish.
6. Uncertainty Costs
Uncertainty costs may arise for consumers in the context of experience
products. Experience products are products that can be evaluated only
after their purchase or consumption.67 Characteristics of these products
are generally hard to identify in advance. Products in this category include
legal and banking services. Additionally, the value of these products
typically depends on individual consumers’ preferences. For example,
people assess the quality of meals and haircuts differently. In these cases,
switching costs emerge because “the experience a customer has had with
the current supplier” clashes with “the lack of experience with alternative
suppliers.”68
Online networking platforms can be categorized as experience
64. Brad Davis, 10 Industries Where Loyalty Programs are Extremely Effective, STAMP ME (Dec.
9, 2019), https://stampme.com/10-industries-where-loyalty-programs-are-extremely-effective/.
65. For example, many airline companies reward loyal clients with points calculated by mileage.
The points can be exchanged for free flight tickets. Points can also expire if not used within a specific
period of time See Yak, Miles and Points Programs Expiration Rules – What You Need to Know, POINTS
YAK (Jan. 21, 2016), https://pointsyak.com/credit-cards/miles-and-points-expiration-rules/
66. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php.
67. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 11.
68. Edlin & Harris, supra note 22, at 182. See also Klemperer, Competition, supra note 25, at 517.
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products and are more likely to create uncertainty costs for two main
reasons. First, the value of online networking platforms depends heavily
on network effects.69 Therefore, the value experienced by users after
switching to other online networking platforms depends on platforms’
user bases, and predicting how platforms’ user bases will develop has
never been an easy task. Second, existing online networking platforms,
including Facebook, modify their services dramatically to respond to fastchanging market conditions. This business practice expands the gaps
between consumers’ expected utility and the real utility of the product.
Uncertainty costs also arise when an established market player is
challenged by a new market entrant. For example, Facebook was a “firstmover” in the realm of online networking platforms and thereby enjoyed
reputational benefits. Research shows that early-movers naturally obtain
benefits from their reputation.70 A first impression plays a critical role in
forming consumers’ preferences. Because the first-mover receives greater
attention from consumers,71 the first-mover will shape consumer
expectations and understandings of the market. The reputational benefits
create trust relationships with users, thereby strengthening users’
confidence and satisfaction with the first-mover’s products. Based on this
analytical framework, users may have feelings of uncertainty leaving
Facebook.
Because it is unclear whether switching costs lock-in users to
Facebook’s services, and this is a largely quantitative question, an
empirical investigation is required to clarify the impact of switching costs
on Facebook’s users.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Research Design
To examine whether Facebook’s users are locked into the platform, this
Section tracks data on the number of users, time spent online, and
advertising revenues of various online networking platforms following
Facebook’s significant privacy violations occurring in 2011 and 2019.
This study does not directly examine specific types of switching costs
because consumers-specific data is not generally available. Instead, this
study refers to two specific privacy violations to illustrate Facebook’s
69. Network effects happen when “adoption by different users is complimentary”. Therefore,
one’s adoption increases other’s incentives to adopt. See Edlin & Hoparris, supra note 22, at 178.
70. Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantage, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 41, 46 (1988) (citing Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An
Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond, 19 RAND J. OF ECON. 458, 462 (1988).
71. Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 70, at 46.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

2021]

MARKET POWER AND SWITCHING COSTS

135

relationship with its users following those violations.
1. 2011-2012 Privacy Breaches
In November 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a
complaint against Facebook, claiming that Facebook was breaking its
privacy protection promises.72 In August 2012, the FTC settled with
Facebook on the condition that “Facebook must obtain consumers’
consent before sharing their information beyond established privacy
settings” and take necessary measures to protect Facebook users. Based
on these terms, Facebook signed the consent order.73 The FTC’s
complaints and the settlement were widely covered by the media and
inspired impassioned public discussions.74
2. Violations of the 2012 Consent Order and Fines
In 2019, the FTC launched another investigation into Facebook’s
conduct. According to the complaint, Cambridge Analytica “had
improperly obtained the private information of more than 50 million
Facebook users” sometime in March 2018.75 The investigation examined
whether Facebook breached the 2012 consent order. Ultimately, the
Department of Justice, on behalf of the FTC, concluded that:
Facebook repeatedly used deceptive disclosure and settings to
undermine users’ privacy preferences in violation of its 2012 FTC order.
72. See Compare Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep
Privacy
Promises,
F.T.C.
(Nov.
29,
2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep, with The FTC’s
settlement with Facebook: Where Facebook went wrong, F.T.C. (Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2011/11/ftcs-settlement-facebook-wherefacebook-went-wrong.
73. See Facebook Must Obtain Consumers' Consent Before Sharing Their Information Beyond
Established Privacy Settings, F.T.C. (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook.
74. See e.g., Somini Sengupta, F.T.C Settles Privacy Issue at Facebook, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 29,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/technology/facebook-agrees-to-ftc-settlement-onprivacy.html; Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Settles FTC Charges Over 2009 Privacy Breaches, CNN
MONEY
(Nov.
29,
2011,
3:09PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/29/technology/facebook_settlement/index.htm; Frederic Lardinois,
Facebook And FTC Settle Privacy Charges — No Fine, But 20 Years Of Privacy Audits TECH CRUNCH
(Aug. 10, 2012, 1:21PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/08/10/facebook-ftc-settlement-12/; Diane Bartz
& Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Settles Privacy Case with FTC REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:39PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-idUSTRE7AS21J20111129; Terrence O'Brien,
FTC and Facebook Settle Privacy Dispute, Skip the Fine ENGADGET (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.engadget.com/2012-08-10-ftc-and-facebook-settle-privacy-dispute-skip-the-fine.html.
75. See Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook to be Fined $5bn for Cambridge Analytica Privacy
Violations
–
Reports
GUARDIAN
(Jul.
12,
2019,
6:12PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/12/facebook-fine-ftc-privacy-violations.
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These tactics allowed the company to share users’ personal information
with third-party apps that were downloaded by the user’s Facebook
‘friends.’… [M]any users were unaware that Facebook was sharing such
information, and therefore did not take the steps needed to opt-out of
sharing. In addition, … Facebook took inadequate steps to deal with apps
that it knew were violating its platform policies.76
Upon completion of the investigation, the FTC imposed a $5 billion
penalty on Facebook, the highest penalty in Commission history. In
addition to paying the record-setting fine, Facebook had to meet
“significant requirements to boost accountability and transparency.”77
The investigation and subsequent fine were widely covered by all major
news outlets and social media platforms in 201878 and 2019.79 Therefore,
it is reasonable to infer that users in the U.S. were aware of Facebook’s
violations.
Modern economic theories have assumed that consumers change
suppliers when their suppliers raise the prices or lower the quality of
products. Further, literature has indicated that most digital service users'
privacy
concerns
stem
from
e-commerce
and
online
80
networking. Applying the same framework to the online networking
76. FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, F.T.C.
(Jul. 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions.
77. Id.
78. See Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, FTC opens investigation into Facebook after Cambridge
Analytica scrapes millions of users’ personal information, WASH. POST (March 20. 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/20/ftc-opens-investigation-intofacebook-after-cambridge-analytica-scrapes-millions-of-users-personal-information/; Cecilia Kang et al.,
Facebook Faces Broadened Federal Investigations Over Data and Privacy, N. Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/technology/facebook-federal-investigations.html; Kurt Wagner,
Facebook may be facing a “multibillion-dollar” fine from the FTC. Here’s why., VOX (Feb. 14, 2019,
5:45PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/1/23/18193314/facebook-ftc-fine-investigation-explainedprivacy-agreement; and Lauren Feiner, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call for Tougher Internet Regulation won’t
Save Facebook from
these Investigations
CNBC
(Mar. 31, 2019, 10:03AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/31/facebook-federal-and-international-investigations-into-dataprivacy.html.
79. See e.g., Brian Fung, Facebook will Pay an Unprecedented $5 Billion Penalty over Privacy
Breaches, CNN BUSINESS (Jul, 25, 2019, 1:08PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/24/tech/facebook-ftcsettlement/index.html; Salvador Rodriguez, How Facebook Stumbled to the Edge of a Government
Breakup, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2019, 9:00AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/09/facebooks-antitrustinvestigations-a-timeline-of-events.html; Mike Snider & Edward C. Baig, Facebook Fined $5 Billion by
FTC, must Update and Adopt New Privacy, Security Measures, USA TODAY(Jul. 24, 2019, 8:54AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/07/24/facebook-pay-record-5-billion-fine-u-s-privacyviolations/1812499001/; and Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N. Y.
TIMES (July 12. 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftc-fine.html (search
by article name).
80. See Eszter Hargittai & Alice Marwich, “What Can I Really Do?” Explaining the Privacy
Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 INT. J. COMMUN. 3737, 3737, 3744-45 (2016); Spyros Kokolakis,
Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: A Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox
Phenomenon, 64 COMPUT. & SEC. 122, 122, 127-28 (2016).
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market, it is expected that Facebook’s users would have rejected the
platform or used it less frequently in response to the above mentioned
privacy violations. Additionally, it is expected that new users will be
added at a slower rate. Under these conditions, one would expect to see a
decline in Facebook’s advertising revenues. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to expect Facebook’s users would seek out alternative online networking
platforms. These platforms would have benefitted financially from the
influx of new users and following increases in advertising revenues as a
result of obtaining those users. As discussed below, the study tests these
assumptions based on a review of the available data.
However, some limitations should be noted. First, the study assumes
that consumers will switch to other suppliers when current suppliers raise
prices or lower the quality of their products. But consumers may not be
rational in the real world, meaning that consumers may switch for reasons
other than the price and quality of goods and services. Second, because of
insufficient information about Facebook’s privacy violations during
2011-2012 and 2018-2019, this study only identifies two privacy
violations that may have incentivized Facebook users to leave the
company. The study acknowledges that apart from the two privacy
violations, other events may have led Facebook users to switch platforms.
The study’s final limitation concerns data collection. Because of limited
access to personal data, the study cannot collect all Facebook users’ data.
Instead, the study collects data from a reliable dataset—Statista, which
has comprehensive data related to online social networking platforms in
the United States.
B. Data Collection
1. Scope
This study focuses on the United States’ online networking market.
Thus, the study collects data on users and advertising revenues from the
following companies: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Pinterest,
Tumblr, and TikTok.
In antitrust analyses, courts generally consider two markets: the
product and geographic market. When examining the product market,
courts test the interchangeability of multiple products from the
perspective of consumers.81 Effectively, if consumers consider that
Product A is substitutable with Product B, courts will conclude that
Products A and B are in the same product market. As to the geographic

81. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 122.
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market, courts generally consider transportation costs.82 If transportation
costs associated with purchasing Products A and B are not substantially
different, courts will determine that the two products are in the same
geographic market.
While all platforms identified above have slight differences, they are
comparable because they allow users to communicate within the digital
space. For example, Instagram’s main service is online networking. The
company is famous for its photo-sharing and video-sharing functions.
Recently, Instagram added two new resources: IGTV and LIFE, allowing
users to interact with friends more actively.83 Although Instagram offers
multiple tools to its users, analogous products may be found in other
online networking platforms such as Pinterest and Snapchat.
Finally, the study focuses on data ranging from 2010 to 2020. Because
the online networking market is rapidly evolving, modern networking
platforms are quite different from their predecessors. Thus, older datasets
may not provide accurate guidance to policymakers.
2. Sources
The study first investigates data collected from Google Trends. The
database shows social media users’ reaction to the alleged two privacy
violations. The study then examines data collected by Statista. Statista
highlights changes in data. For example, one can compare advertising
revenues by year or according to different online networking platforms.
The platform also checks and validates the data. More than 2,000
universities and academic institutions use Statista for research purposes.84
Thus, it is a reputable source for statistical research.
C. Analysis and Findings
In examining the users’ reactions to Facebook’s data breaches, the
study focuses on four data sets: (1) Google search volume, (2) number of
users, (3) amount of time spent online, and (4) advertising revenues.

82. Id.
83. See Features, INSTAGRAM, https://about.instagram.com/features.
84. Trust is Earned When Actions Meet Words, STATISTA https://www.statista.com/aboutus/trust
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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1. Google Search Volume

[Figure 1]
The study used Google Trends to investigate the reactions to the 2019
privacy violation. Google Trends shows “how frequently a given search
term is entered into Google’s search engine relative to the site’s total
search volume over a given period of time.”85 Facebook’s search volume
may be used to highlight the public’s knowledge of their 2019 privacy
violations. Additionally, one can infer whether users are considering
switching to alternative platforms based on their Google searches.
Figure 1 shows the Google search volume concerning the five major
American networking platforms between June 1, 2018, and December 1,
2020. The following search terms were used: Facebook, Instagram,
Pinterest, Snapchat, and TikTok.
The results show that Facebook’s search volume gradually decreased
from June 2018 to December 2020. In comparison, the search volume of
smaller platforms (Pinterest, Snapchat, and TikTok) rose gradually.
Further, near the end of the search period, all five platforms’ search
volumes were similar. Taken together, these observations suggest that
Facebook users may have noticed the company’s privacy breaches in
2019 and expressed interest in other platforms.
To support this inference, this study considers Facebook’s user base,
users’ time spent online, and advertising revenues.

85. Google
Trends:
What
Is
Google
Trends?,
https://www.wordstream.com/google-trends (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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2. Number of Users

[Figure 2]
Figure 2 captures the number of users who relied on Facebook between
2010 and 2020. The data was drawn from Statista. It shows that Facebook
has been steadily adding new users and the 2011 and 2019 privacy
violations did not disturb this trend. It seems that Facebook users did not
leave the platform following the violations, despite the fact that they were
aware of the company’s wrongdoings.
This observation does not conclusively show that Facebook has lockedin its users. Other explanations may account for the growth of the
company’s user base. For example, because the online networking market
is still growing, it is possible that new users kept entering the market and
ended up joining Facebook. Because of such uncertainties, a closer
analysis is required. Therefore, the next data set looks at the rate by which
Facebook’s user base grew over time to determine whether the highprofile privacy violations had an impact on Facebook’s growth.
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[Figure 3]
Figure 3 captures the rate at which Facebook’s user base has changed
over time. The graph demonstrates that Facebook’s user base expanded
by 5% in 2010. However, the growth rate slowed following the 2011
privacy investigations. Specifically, the growth rate decreased sharply
during the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011.
Moreover, Figure 2 also demonstrates that because of the release of the
Department of Justice’s 2011 report detailing Facebook’s privacy
violations, the company’s 2011 growth rate did not match its growth rate
in 2010. Significantly, following the release of the 2019 FTC report in
July 2019, the growth rate once again slowed down.
Collectively, these observations are consistent with the assumption that
users’ willingness to join Facebook decreased following the
aforementioned privacy violations. Alternatively, explanations for
Facebook’s decreasing growth rate during the last quarter of 2010 and the
first quarter of 2011 are that the company had already captured most
online networking users by early 2011, and/or the demand for online
networking services had decreased more than before.
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[Figure 4]
The growth of other online networking platforms during this same time
period suggests that Facebook’s privacy violations had a negative impact
on the company’s growth.
Figure 4 shows that in 2019 and 2020, Facebook had the lowest rate of
growth, which stood at 2%. Comparatively, Twitter’s user base grew by
3.5%. The growth rate of other platforms is notable as well: Instagram
12.5%, Pinterest 4.3%, Snapchat 4.1%, TikTok 22%, Tumblr 3.8%.
Therefore, Facebook’s 2019 privacy violations may have had a negative
impact on its ability to attract new users. The study shows that users may
have become less willing to use Facebook. However, it is not certain
whether the new users who joined Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest,
Snapchat, TikTok, and Tumblr are old Facebook users. Consequently, the
study examines users’ time spent online and Facebook’s advertising
revenues.
3. Length of Time Spent Online
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[Figure 5]
Figure 5 considers the time teenagers spent online. Teenagers made up
nearly 10% of Facebook users in 2019.86 Therefore, teenagers’ reactions
to the two privacy violations may have affected the competition in the
online networking market. Additionally, it is generally recognized that
teenagers are more familiar with online networking platforms. Teenagers
may have lower learning costs when switching platforms. Thus, they are
less likely to be locked-in. For these reasons, the study tracks usage habits
of users who are under 18 to determine whether teenage Facebook users
switched platforms as a result of the two privacy violations.
The study looks at three major online networking platforms: Facebook,
Twitter, and Instagram. The data was drawn from Statista. The figure
shows that Facebook had the largest online user base in the Fall of 2012
followed by Twitter and Instagram. After the 2011 privacy violations,
Facebook’s teenage user base continued to shrink. Conversely,
Instagram’s teenage user base grew from 2012 to 2019.
Figure 5 therefore supports that proposition that teenagers are flexible
in their commitments to online networking platforms. Although Facebook
is still the largest online networking platform, the company does not limit
teenagers’ choices regarding where to conduct social networking

86. See
Pew
Research
Center,
Social
Media
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
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activities. Furthermore, the data suggest that teenagers abandoned
Facebook in favor of other online networking platforms. Notably, in
addition to privacy concerns, there are alternative explanations for
teenagers moving away from Facebook. One such example: they may
leave because their parents started to use Facebook, and they do not want
their parents to see their online profile.
4. Advertising Revenues

[Figure 6]
Changes in advertising revenues may detect the presence of lock-in
effects. It is inferable that Facebook could demand that advertisers pay
higher fees if it maintains a large and an expanding user base. Facebook
can use these advertising revenues to develop more services to further
grow its user base.87 Ultimately, this circle led to Facebook's
unprecedented business success. Notably, in 2020, Facebook earned over
$ 2.1 billion from advertising revenues.88
As illustrated above, a large user base is critical to Facebook’s ability
87. See Rob Frieden, Two-Sided Internet Markets and the Need to Assess Both Upstream and
Downstream Impacts, 68 AM. U. L. R. 713, 723-25 (2019). As Facebook does not charge non-business
users for its social networking service, advertising fees from business users become the main source of
revenue. The company uses the revenue to develop its platforms to attract more users, allowing it to charge
business users with higher advertising fees to generate greater revenue.
88. See Facebook's Global Revenue as of 4th Quarter 2020, by Segment, STATISTA (Jul. 29, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/277963/facebooks-quarterly-global-revenue-bysegment/#:~:text=In%20the%20third%20quarter%20of,is%20generated%20via%20mobile%20devices.
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to attract advertisers. Lock-in users are undoubtedly one of the key
ingredients to generate advertising revenues. Advertising revenues grow
proportionally to the level of users on Facebook. More users and time
spent online translate to Facebook’s ability to charge higher advertising
fees.
Figure 6 shows the growth rate for Facebook’s advertising revenues.
The data shows that the growth rate slowed following the 2011 and 2012
privacy breaches followed by a sharp increase between 2012 and 2013.
Notably, the second sharp decline occurred during the 2019 privacy
violations.
This significant reduction in advertising revenues indicates that there
were likely changes in the company’s user base. Combined with the other
findings on changes in Facebook’s user base, the data indicates that the
two privacy violations had a negative effect on Facebook’s user base and,
in turn, affected the company’s advertising revenues. This conclusion is
consistent with the findings captured in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
The alternative explanation for Facebook’s reduced advertising
revenues is that the company’s unacceptable reputation for privacy
violations led to businesses’ unwillingness to advertise on the platform.
Even so, this does not invalidate the study’s findings. Rather, this
explanation would reveal the presence of competing firms that are
interchangeable with Facebook, demonstrating businesses’ freedom to
switch among platforms. The finding therefore supports the inference that
Facebook could not lock-in business users.

\
[Figure 7]
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Figure 7 compares Facebook’s advertising revenues to the other
platforms before and after the 2019 privacy violations. It indicates that
after the 2019 privacy violations, Facebook’s advertising revenues
dropped from $10 billion to $8.4 billion (a 16% decrease). However, at
the same time, Instagram’s advertising revenues increased from $9.45
billion to $13.86 billion (a 146% increase), Snapchat’s advertising
revenues rose from $1.53 billion to $2.11 billion (a 138% increase), and
Pinterest’s advertising revenues increased from $1 billion to $1.39 billion
(a 139% increase).
These findings suggest that market factors did not likely influence
Facebook’s diminished advertising revenues. Other online networking
platforms in similar conditions experienced growth. This may also
indicate that the 2019 privacy violations reduced Facebook users’
willingness to stay on the platform. Facebook’s loss of users affected its
advertising revenues. Facebook’s advertising revenues declined, while
the revenues of its competitors grew based on new users and advertising.
These findings suggest that users can freely switch between various
online networking platforms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Switching costs can indicate Facebook’s market power. Switching
costs can be divided into six types: search costs, compatibility costs,
transaction costs, learning costs, contractual costs, and uncertainty costs.
Among them, compatibility, learning, and uncertainty costs are most
likely to occur in the online networking market. These costs may
discourage Facebook’s users from switching to other networking
platforms.
However, the findings of this Article suggest that Facebook may not
have substantial market power in the online networking market. The
Article analyzed the data concerning the number of users, time spent
online, and advertising revenues of major online networking platforms
before and after Facebook’s privacy violations in 2011 and 2019.
This Article found that Facebook’s search volume decreased gradually
beginning in June 2018. Similarly, Facebook’s users and advertising
revenues decreased after the announcement of privacy violations.
Conversely, Google search volume increased for other platforms.
Furthermore, new users were added to these platforms, and this translated
into additional advertising revenues. Taken together, these findings
suggest that Facebook users are still free to switch among various online
networking platforms. No substantial switching costs discourage users
from abandoning the platform. As a result, under the switching costs
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approach, although Facebook may still have market power, that power is
neither significant nor limitless. Instead, Facebook users’ abilities to
freely switch among different platforms—and the data suggesting that
they do—reduces the company’s ability to exploit users. Further, these
findings can be used to argue that Facebook would not have sufficient
market power to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
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